



vol. 2 | n. 3 | setembro/dezembro 2015 | ISSN 2359-5639 | Periodicidade quadrimestral
Curitiba | Núcleo de Investigações Constitucionais da UFPR | www.ninc.com.br
Licenciado sob uma Licença Creative Commons
Licensed under Creative Commons
35Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 35-59, set./dez. 2015.
 
Como citar esse artigo/How to cite this article: ALBERT, Richard. The progressive era of constitutional amendment. Revista de Inves-
tigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 35-59, set./dez. 2015. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v2i3.44528
* This project was supported by the Boston College Law School Fund.
** Associate Professor at Boston College Law School (Boston, USA), where he specializes in constitutional law and comparative cons-
titutional law. Visiting Associate Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University (2015-16). Juris Doctor – J.D. (Yale University); 
Bachelor of Civil Law – B.C.L. (Oxford University); Master of Laws – LL.M. (Harvard University). In 2010, he received the Hessel Yntema 
Prize, which is given annually to a scholar under the age of 40 to recognize “the most outstanding article” on comparative law. Ri-
chard Albert is Book Reviews Editor for the peer-reviewed American Journal of Comparative Law, an elected member of the Interna-
tional Academy of Comparative Law, an elected member of the Executive Committee of the American Society of Comparative Law, 
a member of the Governing Council of the International Society of Public Law, a Distinguished Academic Associate at the Centre for 
Law and Religion at Cardiff Law School, a Senior Research Fellow at the Council for Canadian Democracy, and a founding editor of 
I-CONnect, the new scholarly blog of the International Journal of Constitutional Law (I-CON). E-mail: richard.albert@bc.edu. 
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais
ISSN 2359-5639
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5380/rinc.v2i3.44528
The progressive era of constitutional amendment* 
A era progressiva das emendas constitucionais
RICHARD ALBERT**
Boston College Law School (United States of America)
richard.albert@bc.edu
Recebido/Received: 28.07.2015 / July 28th, 2015
Aprovado/Approved: 19.08.2015 / August 19th, 2015
Resumo
Neste ensaio, explora-se a motivação que ensejou a 17ª 
Emenda à Constituição dos Estados Unidos, que foi em 
grande medida impulsionada por um esforço para comba-
ter a corrupção nas eleições senatoriais. Inicia-se exploran-
do a dificuldade de alteração formal da Constituição nos 
Estados Unidos. São então explicadas as regras de altera-
ção formal e analisados brevemente os estudos empíricos 
que apontam que a Constituição dos Estados Unidos é uma 
das mais difíceis de alterar do mundo, se não a mais difícil. 
Em seguida, discute-se a Era Progressiva, um período de 
tempo durante o qual a alteração formal da Constituição 
parecia muito mais fácil de ser empreendida do que é hoje. 
Esse movimento e seus propósitos são examinados, e em 
seguida são situadas as quatro emendas constitucionais 
da Era Progressiva. Finalmente, o estudo concentra-se em 
uma destas quatro emendas, a décima sétima, e investiga 
as motivações que conduziram à sua adoção, bem como 
Abstract
In this Essay I explore the impetus for the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which was in large measure driven by an 
effort to curb corruption in senatorial elections. I begin 
by exploring the difficulty of formal amendment in the 
United States. I explain the rules of formal amendment 
and I review briefly the empirical literature suggesting 
that the United States Constitution is one of the world’s 
most difficult to amend, if not the most difficult. Then, I 
discuss the Progressive Era, a period of time during which 
formal amendment seemed much easier than it is today. 
I review the movement and its purposes, and I situate the 
four Progressive Era amendments. Finally, I focus on one 
of these four amendments, the Seventeenth, and consid-
er the motivations driving its adoption as well as current 
critiques about its effectiveness. I conclude by question-
ing whether repealing the Seventeenth Amendment 
would necessarily reinstate indirect senatorial elections 
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as a matter of practice, whatever it would mean as a mat-
ter of formal law.
Keywords: constitutional amendments; Progressive Era; 
Seventeenth amendment; corruption; United States of 
America.
nas atuais críticas sobre sua eficácia. O trabalho é conclu-
ído questionando-se se a revogação da 17ª emenda iria ne-
cessariamente restabelecer as eleições senatoriais indiretas 
em termos práticos, independentemente do que isso viesse 
a significar em termos de lei formal.
Palavras-chave: emendas constitucionais; Era Progressi-
va; 17ª Emenda à Constituição dos Estados Unidos; corrup-
ção; Estados Unidos da América.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As hard as it is today to formally amend the United States Constitution—and 
empirical studies confirm that it is one of the hardest, if not the hardest, to amend in 
the democratic world1—the United States Constitution was once thought too easy to 
amend. During the Progressive Era, a period of significant social activism and institu-
tional reform from the 1890s through the 1920s, political actors in the United States 
adopted four constitutional amendments in a short span of roughly 10 years: the Six-
teenth Amendment, authorizing a direct income tax2; the Seventeenth Amendment, 
establishing direct elections to the United States Senate3; the Eighteenth Amendment, 
imposing prohibition4; and the Nineteenth Amendment, constitutionalizing women’s 
suffrage.5 
In this Essay prepared for a conference on corruption and institutional design 
in comparative perspective, I explore the impetus for the Seventeenth Amendment, 
which was in large measure driven by an effort to curb corruption in senatorial elec-
tions. The Amendment altered the way political candidates are selected for the Unit-
ed States Senate, moving from indirect to direct elections. Under the original terms of 
the Constitution, senatorial appointments were made by state legislative vote,6 but in 
1913 the Seventeenth Amendment required that the people of each state elect their 
1  See infra Section 2.2.
2  U.S. Const., amend. XVI (1913).
3  U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913).
4  U.S. Const., amend. XVIII (1919). 
5  U.S. Const., amend. XIX (1920).
6  U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (1789).
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senators by popular vote.7 It took less than one year to ratify the Amendment, no small 
feat given that formally amending the United States Constitution requires the approv-
al of two-thirds of the Congress to propose an amendment and three-quarters of the 
states to ratify it.8 
I begin, in Part 2, by exploring the difficulty of formal amendment in the United 
States. I explain the rules of formal amendment and I review briefly the empirical liter-
ature suggesting that the United States Constitution is one of the world’s most difficult 
to amend, if not the most difficult. In Part 3, I discuss the Progressive Era, a period of 
time during which formal amendment seemed much easier than it is today. I review the 
movement and its purposes, and I situate the four Progressive Era amendments. In Part 
4, I focus on one of these four amendments, the Seventeenth, and consider the moti-
vations driving its adoption as well as current critiques about its effectiveness. Today, 
one hundred years since its entrenchment, the Seventeenth Amendment has attracted 
some dissidents proposing to repeal it, calling for a return to the pre-Amendment sena-
torial amendment rule of indirect election. The challenge for these opponents, howev-
er, is that it is much harder today to amend the Constitution than it was when it was first 
adopted. I conclude by questioning whether repealing the Seventeenth Amendment 
would necessarily reinstate indirect senatorial elections as a matter of practice, whatev-
er it would mean as a matter of formal law. This Essay is part of a larger scholarly project 
aimed at understanding the evolving perception and reality of formal amendment dif-
ficulty in the United States. It is an exploratory set of reflections not intended to present 
definitive answers but rather to trace lines of future inquiry.
2. THE DIFFICULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES
Studies of amendment difficulty confirm what scholars have long suspected: the 
United States Constitution is one of the world’s most difficult, if not the most difficult, to 
formally amend.9 The rigidity of the Constitution today derives both from the design of 
formal amendment rules entrenched in the constitutional text and from sources exter-
nal to the text, including the geographic expansion of the Union since the adoption of 
the Constitution and the polarization of political parties. Amending the United States 
Constitution today is so hard that it might well be impossible.
7  U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913). The Amendment also establishes a procedure to fill Senate vacancies. See ibid.
8  U.S. Const., art. V (1789). Article V also sketches a way for constitutional amendment by constitutional con-
vention. But this process has not yet been successfully used under the present Constitution. See FISCH, William 
B. Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, American Journal Comparative Law (supple-
ment), Ann Arbor, vol. 54, n.4 p.485, 490-491, 2006. p. 490.
9  See infra Section 2.2.
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2.1.  Amending the United States Constitution
There are two steps to formally amend the Constitution: proposal by a two-
thirds supermajority and ratification by a three-quarters supermajority.10 Article V as-
signs each of these two tasks to different institutions—the Congress, the states, and 
state or national constitutional conventions—and pairs these two tasks in various ways 
to create four separate methods of formal amendment. First, two-thirds of Congress 
may propose an amendment and three-quarters of the states may then ratify it by con-
stitutional conventions. Second, two-thirds of Congress may propose an amendment 
and three-quarters of the states may ratify it by state legislative vote. Third, two-thirds 
of the states may petition Congress to call a constitutional convention to propose an 
amendment and three-quarters of the states may then ratify it by constitutional con-
ventions. Fourth, two-thirds of the states may petition Congress to call a constitutional 
convention to propose an amendment and three-quarters of the states may ratify it by 
state legislative vote. In all cases, Congress chooses the method of ratification, whether 
by state legislative vote or state convention.
Congresspersons have introduced thousands of amendments but only thir-
ty-three have satisfied the two-thirds congressional supermajority requirement to of-
ficially propose an amendment to the states.11 Of those, only twenty-seven have met 
the three-quarters ratification threshold to entrench the proposed amendment into 
the text of Constitution. The most recent formal amendment was ratified in 1992, hav-
ing been first proposed by Congress and transmitted to the states two hundred years 
earlier in 1789. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment prohibits Congress from giving itself 
a salary raise until an intervening election has been held.12 Given this long delay be-
tween the proposal and ratification, some scholars have raised doubts as to the validi-
ty of the amendment,13 all to no avail.14 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment, the next-most 
recent amendment ratified twenty years earlier in 1971, fixes the voting age in federal 
10  U.S. Const., art. V (1789).
11  SULLIVAN, Kathleen M. Constitutional Constancy: Why Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever. 
Cardozo Law Review. New York, v. 17, n. 3, p. 691-704,  jan. 1996. p. 692.
12  U.S.  Const., amend. XXVII (1992).
13  See, e.g., KENNEDY, Christopher M. Is There a Twenty-Seventh Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of a New 
203-Year-Old Amendment. Marshall Law Review. Chicago, v. 26, n. 4, p. 977-1019, jul./sept. 1993; LEVINSON, 
Sanford. Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment. Constitution-
al Commentary. Saint Paul, v. 11, n. 1, p. 101-113, dec./feb. 1994; SPOTTS, JoAnne D. The Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment: A Late Bloomer or a Dead Horse? The Georgia State University Law Review. Atlanta, v. 10, n. 2, 
p. 337-365,    jan.1994; STRICKLAND, Ruth Ann. The Twenty-Seventh Amendment and Constitutional Change 
by Stealth. PS: Political Science & Politics. New York, v. 26, n. 4, p. 716-722, dec. 1993; ALSTYNE, William Van. 
What do you Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment? Constitutional Commentary.  Williamsburg, v. 
10, n. 1, p. 9-18, nov. 1993.
14  Congress did not contest the validity of the amendment, see MCGREAL, Paul E. There is no Such Thing as 
Textualism: A Case Study in Constitutional Method. Fordham Law Review. New York, v. 69, n. 6, p. 2393-2469, 
may 2001. p. 2431. Nor did the Department of Justice, see Memorandum Opinion for Counsel to the President, 
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and state elections at 18 years old, the same age at which the military draft applies.15 
Prior to 1970, formal amendment appears to have been more frequent: the first fifteen 
amendments were ratified from 1789 to 1870; from 1871 to 1933, there were six; and 
from 1934 to 1970, there were four. 
The extraordinarily onerous formal amendment rules and the infrequency of 
modern formal amendment have prompted scholars to suggest that Article V is virtual-
ly impossible to use. Bruce Ackerman, for example, has referred to Article V as an ‘obso-
lescent obstacle course’.16 Sanford Levinson argues that Article V ‘mak[es] it functionally 
impossible to amend the Constitution with regard to anything controversial’.17 Richard 
Primus sees the possibility of formal amendment as ‘generally remote’.18 Joel Colón-Ríos 
and Allan Hutchinson call Article V ‘one of the most demanding constitutional amend-
ment processes in the world’.19 And Jeffrey Goldsworthy has argued that ‘the superma-
joritarian requirements of Article V are so onerous as to be arguably undemocratic, by 
making it much too easy for minorities to veto constitutional amendments’.20
What makes Article V so difficult to successfully use is more than just its de-
sign requiring supermajorities at both the proposal and ratification stages. It is also 
that the geographic expansion of the Union has exacerbated amendment difficulty by 
increasing the denominator for Article V amendments from thirteen in 1789 to fifty 
since 1967. Nearly quadrupling the denominator for the three-quarters requirement 
for state ratification has made it much harder to formally amend the Constitution, as 
Rosalind Dixon explains: ‘On one calculation, if one were to try to adjust for this change 
in the denominator for Article V, the functional equivalent to the 75% super-majority 
requirement adopted by the framers would in fact now be as low as 62%’.21 In addition, 
the deepening political polarization in American society in general and specifically be-
tween the two dominant political parties has raised barriers to political agreement on 
16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 87 (Nov. 2, 1992), and a federal court declined to hear a challenge to it. See Boehner 
v. Anderson, 809 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1992)
15  Idem. at amend. XXVI (1971).
16  ACKERMAN, Bruce A. Transformative Appointments. Havard Law Review. Cambridge, vol. 101, n. 6, p. 1164-
1184, apr. 1988. p. 1183.
17  LEVINSON, Sanford. How I Lost my Constitutional Faith. Maryland Law Review. Prince George's, v. 71, n. 4, 
p. 956-977, oct. 2012. p. 969.
18  PRIMUS, Richard A. When Should Original Meanings Matter? Michigan Law Review. Ann Arbor, vol. 107, n. 
2, p. 165-222, 2008. p. 211.
19  COLÓN-RÍOS, Joel; HUTCHINSON, Allan. Democracy and Revolution: An Enduring Relationship? Denver Uni-
versity Law Review. Denver, v. 89, n. 3, p. 593-611, jul./sept. 2012. p. 602.
20  GOLDSWORTHY, Jeffrey. Constitutional Cultures, Democracy, and Unwritten Principles. University of Illi-
nois Law Review. Champaign, v. 18, n. 2, p. 683-710, apr. 2012. p. 694.
21  DIXON, Rosalind. Partial Constitutional Amendments. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitu-
tional Law.  Philadelphia, v. 13, n. 3, p. 643-685, mar. 2011. p 653..
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fundamental changes.22 This political polarization has increased amendment difficulty, 
making it harder to gather the supermajorities required both to propose and ratify an 
amendment.
As hard as it is to formally amend the United States Constitution, it is not as 
rigid as it could be. The Constitution does not entrench a formally unamendable con-
stitutional provision, as do many of the world’s democratic constitutions.23 The United 
States Constitution entrenches two provisions that once were temporarily unamend-
able, until the year 1808, but this unamendability has since expired and no longer 
constrains constitutional amendment.24 The Constitution does, however, entrench a 
form of unamendability that I have called ‘constructive unamendability’, a reference to 
a non-textual form of unamendability that derives not from an outright prohibition on 
amendment but rather from a political climate that makes it practically impossible to 
assemble the supermajorities needed to propose and ratify a constitutional amend-
ment.25 The paradigmatic case of a constructively unamendable provision in the United 
States is the Equal Suffrage Clause, which guarantees that ‘no State, without its Consent, 
shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate’.26 It is unlikely that a state would 
ever agree to diminish its representation in the United States Senate. Hence the clause’s 
unamendability. It is important to stress, however, that constructive unamendability 
is not permanent; a constitutional provision may flow into and out of constructive un-
amendability over time in light of the prevailing political climate.
2.2.  Empirical studies of amendment difficulty
Scholars have undertaken empirical studies to measure the difficulty of formal 
amendment. The leading study at the moment, by Donald Lutz, measures amendment 
difficulty in thirty-two democratic constitutions.27 Lutz begins by quantifying the dif-
ficulty of each discrete step formal amendment procedures—Lutz identifies 68 pos-
sible steps from initiation through final assent—and then assigns a total value for a 
22  See KYVIG, David E. Explicit and Authentic Acts: Amending the U.S. Constitution, 1776-1995. Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 1996. p. 426; PILDES, Richard H. Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyper-
polarized Democracy in America. California Law Review. Berkeley, v. 99, n. 2. p. 273-333, apr. 2011. p. 332-33; 
LEVINSON, Daryl J.; PILDES, Richard H. Separation of Parties, Not Powers. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 
119, n. 8, p. 2311-2386, june 2006. p. 2333.
23  See ALBERT, Richard. The Structure of Constitutional Amendment Rules. Wake Forest Law Review. v. 49, p. 
913-975, nov. 2014. p. 950-52.
24  See ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V. Boston University Law Re-
view, Boston, vol. 94, n. 3, p. 1029-1082, may 2014. p. 1041-42.
25  See ALBERT, Richard. Constructive Unamendability in Canada and the United States. Supreme Court Law 
Review, v. 67, n. 2, p. 181-219, jan. 2014. p. 181-196..
26  U.S. Const., art. V.
27  LUTZ, Donald S. Principles of Constitutional Design. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. p. 166-77.
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constitution’s amendment difficulty by aggregating the sum of each step.28 Lutz con-
cludes that the United States Constitution is the world’s most difficult to amend, ranked 
first with a total score of 5.10, well above the next-most difficult constitutions to amend, 
the Swiss and Venezuelan Constitutions, each tied with a score of 4.75.29 There are some 
limitations to the Lutz study, but it nonetheless seems to support what scholars have 
long believed: that the United States Constitution is among the world’s most rigid 
constitutions.30
There are other empirical studies, albeit less prominent ones, of amendment 
difficulty. Astrid Lorenz has a published a study measuring amendment difficulty in 39 
constitutional democracies, concluding that the United States Constitution ranks sec-
ond behind Belgium.31 Arend Lijphart has published his own classification of amend-
ment difficulty, a four-category ranking of 36 democratic constitutions according to the 
kinds of majorities required to formally amend the constitution.32 In Lijphart’s classifi-
cation, the United States ranks in the top group for amendment difficulty along with 
Australia, Canada, Japan and Switzerland.33
Measuring amendment difficulty is itself difficult, however. As Tom Ginsburg 
and James Melton have argued, convincingly I believe, amendment culture may be 
more important in quantifying how difficult it is to formally amend a constitution than 
assigning a value to various steps involved in the amendment process.34 By ‘amend-
ment culture’, Ginsburg and Melton mean the relative frequency and success of consti-
tutional amendment and generally how the practice of constitutional amendment is 
perceived by those governed by the rules themselves.35 Christopher Eisgruber makes 
this point about the difficulty of measuring amendment difficulty in the United States 
under the rules of Article V: ‘their impact will turn upon a number of cultural consid-
erations, such as the extent to which state politics differ from national politics and 
the extent to which people are receptive to or skeptical about the general idea of 
28  LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. Ibidem. 
29  LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. p. 170.
30  One notable limitation is that Lutz did not include Canada in his study. The reason why, he explains, is that he 
found it difficult to identify what possesses ‘constitutional status’ in the country, and therefore what is subject 
to change by formal amendment. LUTZ, Donald S. Idem. p. 179 n. 6. Elsewhere, I have argued that the Consti-
tution of Canada is more difficult to amend than the United States Constitution, and that Canada would have 
ranked above the United States had Lutz included Canada in his study sample. See ALBERT, Richard. The Diffi-
culty of Constitutional Amendment in Canada. Alberta Law Review. Edmonton, v. 52, n. 5 (still unpublished) 
31  LORENZ, Astrid. How to Measure Constitutional Rigidity. Journal of Theoretical Politics. [s.l.], v. 17, n. 3, p. 
339-361,  july 2005. p. 358-59.
32  LIJPHART, Arend. Patterns of Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999. p. 220.
33  LIJPHART, Arend. Idem. Ibidem.
34  See GINSBURG, Tom; MELTON, James. Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All? Amendment 
Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty. Chicago Working Papers on Law and Eco-
nomics. Chicago, n. 682, p. 1-29, may 2014.
35  GINSBURG, Tom; MELTON, James. Idem.
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constitutional amendment’.36 Despite the challenge of measuring amendment difficul-
ty, no one will disagree that the constitutional structure and politics of Article V make 
the United States Constitution very difficult to amend.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA
But the United States Constitution was not always thought difficult to amend. In 
the 1910s, political actors proposed and ratified a series of four constitutional amend-
ments in rapid succession. This burst of amendment activity prompted William Mar-
bury, writing at the end of the decade, to suggest that the Constitution had become 
too easy to amend, a departure from the prevailing belief at the time, not unlike what it 
is today, that the Constitution was very difficult to amend: ‘Until lately, it appears never 
to have occurred to any one in this country that there need be any fear that the Con-
stitution could be too readily amended’, observed Marbury, referencing the outdated 
view that ‘on the contrary, the prevailing impression was that it was almost impossible 
to amend that great instrument, except by something in the nature of a revolution’.37 
But the four amendments disrupted the conventional view of the difficulty of formal 
amendment in the United States. The ease of formal amendment then and its difficulty 
today suggest that amendment difficulty is variable across time, driven by the particu-
larities of the moment, by the consolidation and disintegration of political forces, and 
also by the evolution of norms. The impetus behind the amendability of the Constitu-
tion in the 1910s was the progressive movement.
3.1.  The movement and its purposes
Although scholars refer to the group engaged in promoting social change in 
American society from the 1890s to the 1920s as the “progressive movement,” the truth 
is that the objectives pursued and the advancements achieved during this period were 
driven by a complex aggregation of agents and forces that defy such simple shorthand. 
It is nonetheless possible to identify the three objectives, broadly stated, that define 
what came to be known as the progressive movement: improving the exercise and 
tools of democracy, using government to help those in need, and curbing the influence 
of privileged interests. A leading analysis of the time sums it up as follows:
In this widespread political agitation that at first sight seems so incoherent and chaotic, 
there may be distinguished upon examination and analysis three tendencies. The first 
36  EISGRUBER, Christopher L. Constitutional Self-Government. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001. 
p. 22.
37  MARBURY, William L. The Limitations upon the Amendment Power. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 33, 
n. 2, p. 223-235, dec. 1919. p. 223.
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of these tendencies is found in the insistence by the best men in all political parties that 
special, minority, and corrupt influence in government—national, state, and city—be 
removed; the second tendency is found in the demand that the structure or machinery 
of government, which has hitherto been admirably adapted to control by the few, be so 
changed and modified that it will be more difficult for the few, and easier for the many, 
to control; and, finally, the third tendency is found in the rapidly growing conviction 
that the functions of government at present are too restricted and that they must be 
increased and extended to relieve social and economic distress. These three tendencies 
with varying emphasis are seen to-day in the platform and program of every political 
party; they are manifested in the political changes and reforms that are advocated and 
made in the nation, the states, and the cities; and, because of their universality and defi-
niteness, they may be said to constitute the real progressive movement.38
The movement declined in the 1920s and ultimately lost its momentum. One 
of the movement’s amendments, the Eighteenth, was repealed in 1933, fourteen years 
after it had been adopted in 1919.39 The movement had never found the right political 
vehicle to formalize its program, nor could progressives even agree on a common pro-
gram, perhaps as a result of the tensions among progressives themselves and the lack 
of a national leader or an organized structure of leadership.40
But the movement has left a legacy that continues to shape American politics 
today. Concern about special interest control of public institutions led the movement 
to promote direct democracy in its many forms, including the ballot initiative, the pop-
ular referendum and the recall power.41 Reformers wanted to reduce the power of elites 
in the electoral process.42 The common denominator in these three devices, as Nathan-
iel Persily writes, was ‘the delegation of political decisions to the ordinary voter’.43 South 
Dakota was the first state to adopt the initiative and the referendum in 1898.44 Roughly 
20 other states followed suit from 1900 through 1918 as direct democracy grew in pop-
ularity and as progressives won an important victory on the constitutionality of direct 
38  WITT, Benjamin Parke De. The Progressive Movement. New York: MacMillan, 1915. p. 4-5.
39  U.S. Const., amend. XXI (1933).
40  See LINK, Arthur S. What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920’s? American Historical Re-
view. Oxford, v. 64, n. 4, p. 833-851, oct. 1959. p. 842.
41  EULE, Julian N. Judicial Review of Direct Democracy. Yale Law Journal. New Haven, v. 99, p. 1503-1558, may 
1990. p. 1546.
42  HENRETTA, James A. Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional Tradition. Rutgers Law Journal. Cam-
den, v. 22. p. 819-839, 1991. p. 824. 
43  PERSILY, Nathaniel A. The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative, Referendum and Re-
call Developed in the American West. Michigan Law & Policy Review. Ann Arbor, v. 2, p. 11-41, jan. 1997. p. 13. 
44  See MAGLEBY, David B. Taking the Initiative: Direct Legislation and Direct Democracy in the 1980s. PS: Polit-
ical Science & Politics. New York, v. 21, n. 3, p. 600-611, jul./sept. 1988. p. 602.
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democracy in the United States Supreme Court.45 The Court held that federal constitu-
tional challenges to state constitutional provisions authorizing the initiative or referen-
dum are non-justiciable political questions over which the Court has no jurisdiction.46 
3.2.  The progressive amendments
Part of the legacy of the Progressive Era also includes constitutional amend-
ments. In a span of roughly ten years, political actors entrenched four constitutional 
amendments. In 1909, Congress passed the Sixteenth Amendment, authorizing an in-
come tax, and the states ratified it four years later in 1913; in 1912, Congress passed 
the Seventeenth Amendment, establishing direct elections to the United States Senate, 
and the states ratified it the next year in 1913; in 1917, Congress passed the Eighteenth 
Amendment, which imposed prohibition, and the states ratified it two years later in 
1919; and in 1919, Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment, prohibiting gender 
discrimination in the right to vote, and the states ratified it just over one year later in 
1920.47 
David Strauss has argued that these four amendments simply formalized chang-
es that had already become political facts. He may be right but these amendments still 
show how important a period of social change the Progressive Era was for the country, 
which Strauss himself recognizes.48 Akhil Amar situates these progressive amendments 
along a ‘democratizing trendline’49 that ‘call[s] dramatic attention to the arc of histo-
ry,’50 as Americans amended the Constitution to authorize progressive income taxation 
and the direct election of Senators, and to enfranchise women.51 Not all progressives 
supported prohibition but ‘the various strands of progressivism were united, however, 
at the level of basic assumptions’.52 James Timberlake has connected the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the larger effort to limit the corrupting influence of the liquor indus-
try.53 Alan Grimes refers to these four as ‘the western amendments’ because they arose 
from what he sees as a ‘struggle [that] pitted the West, for the most part the last eighteen 
45  See MILLER, Kenneth P. Direct Democracy and the Courts. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. p. 
34-36.
46  Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
47  See The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/con-
stitution_amendments_11-27.html (last accessed September 1, 2015).
48  See STRAUSS, David A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments. Harvard Law Review. Cambridge, v. 
114, n. 5, p.1457-1460, mar. 2001.
49  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Constitution: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2005. p. 412.
50  AMAR, Akhil Reed. Idem. p. 685.
51  AMAR, Akhil Reed. Idem. Ibidem.
52  KYVIG, David E. Repealing National Prohibition. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2000. p. 8. 
53  See TIMBERLAKE, James H. Prohibition and the Progressive Movement, 1900-1920. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1963.
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of the forty-eight states in the Union, against the states that had grown out of the initial 
thirteen colonies’.54 He situates these amendments in the conflict between ‘urban and 
rural constituencies’, ‘industrial and agrarian interests’, and ‘boss-oriented politics and 
chautauqua-style politics’.55
Today, perhaps the most controversial of these progressive amendments is the 
Seventeenth. Scholars have called for its repeal,56 as have political actors,57 most no-
tably current Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, who, when asked what he would 
change about the United States Constitution answered that ‘there’s very little that I 
would change’ although the Seventeenth Amendment is one of the few items he would 
change if he could, as he explained in a public forum:
I would change [the Constitution] back to what they wrote, in some respects. The Seven-
teenth Amendment has changed things enormously. … We changed that in a burst of 
progressivism in 1913, and you can trace the decline of so-called states’ rights through-
out the rest of the 20th century. So, don’t mess with the Constitution.58
Justice Scalia’s criticism of the Seventeenth Amendment is anchored in feder-
alism. The critique has its strongest voice in Ralph Rossum, who had earlier suggested 
that the Amendment effectively repealed federalism by removing an important state 
check on the national government. Rossum argued that federalism, at least as it was 
understood by the authors of the Constitution, ‘effectively died as a result of the social 
and political forces that resulted in the adoption and ratification of the Seventeenth 
Amendment’.59 In the next Part, I focus not on this aspect of the Amendment but rather 
on a narrower inquiry into its corruption-fighting origins. I will then explore the bases 
for the calls today to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment.
54  GRIMES, Alan P. Democracy and the Amendments to the Constitution. Lexington: Lexington Books, 1978. 
p. 66.
55  GRIMES, Alan P. Idem. Ibidem.
56  See, e.g., C.H. HOEBEKE, C.H. The Road to Mass Democracy: Original Intent and the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995; BARNETT, Randy. The Case for the Repeal Amendment. Ten-
nessee Law Review. Knoxville, v. 78, n. 12, p. 813-822, mar. 2011; ZYWICKI, Todd J. Beyond the Shell and Husk 
of History: The History of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals. The 
Cleveland State Law Review. v. 45, n. 2,  p. 165-234, mar./may 1997.
57 See, e.g., SEITZ-WALD, Alex. Repeal the 17th Amendment! Salon. Available at: http://www.salon.
com/2012/08/16/repeal_the_17th_amendment (last accessed September 1, 2015 JOHNSON, Keith. Anti-Wash-
ington Ire Kindles an Old Debate. Wall Street Journal. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142
4052702304879604575582192395853212 (last accessed September 1, 2015); BAI, Matt. Tea Party’s Push on 
Senate Election Exposes Limits. N.Y. Times, June 1, 2010, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/
us/politics/02bai.html (last accessed September 1, 2015).
58  ‘Scalia, Breyer Spar Over Supreme Court Issues’, Associated Press, November 12, 2010, available at: http://
www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/12/scalia-breyer-spar-supreme-court-issues (last accessed September 1, 
2015).
59  ROSSUM, Ralph A. Federalism, the Supreme Court, and the Seventeenth Amendment: The Irony of 
Constitutional Democracy. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2001. p. 3.
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4. THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT
The Seventeenth Amendment changed how political candidates are selected 
for the United States Senate. The senatorial selection process was once indirect but 
it is now direct: no longer are senators chosen by state legislatures; senators are now 
elected directly by voters in each state. Under the original design of the Constitution, 
the senatorial appointments rule required that ‘The Senate of the United States shall be 
composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six 
Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote’.60 But, in 1913, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment changed the appointments rule, and since then it requires that ‘The Senate of 
the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the 
people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each 
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of 
the State legislatures’.61 The amendment did not take long to ratify. Congress approved 
it on May 13, 1912, and three-quarters of the states had ratified it less than a year later 
by April 8, 1913.62
The rapid ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment might suggest that polit-
ical actors devoted little deliberation to it. But moving from indirect to direct senatorial 
elections had been a subject of national political interest for almost one hundred years 
prior. In 1826, a congressperson introduced an amendment to create direct elections 
for senators; this was followed by a similar proposal in 1835, and five more between 
1850 and 1855.63 Later in 1860, Andrew Johnson, then a senator but later president, 
renewed the calls for direct senatorial elections that he had earlier made as a member 
of the House of Representatives.64 As president, Johnson continued to press for the 
change, sending a special message to Congress on the subject in 1868 and taking the 
position again in his State of the Union address that same year.65 At the time, however, 
the nation was occupied with Reconstruction and as a result, as George Haynes writes, 
‘even if President Johnson’s advocacy had been calculated to commend the measure 
to the favorable attention of Congress, little room was left for consideration of such a 
change in the Constitution’.66
Public interest in moving from indirect to direct senatorial elections began to 
grow quickly shortly thereafter. There were more and more congressional resolutions 
60  U.S. Const., art. I, § 3, cl. 1. (1789).
61  U.S. Const., amend. XVII (1913). The amendment also establishes a procedure to fill Senate vacancies. See ibid.
62  See The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/con-
stitution_amendments_11-27.html (last accessed September 1, 2015).
63  See HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1912. p. 101-102.
64  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 102.
65  HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem. 
66  HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem. 
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and amendment proposals,67 citizens and associations took up the cause, and state and 
national political parties made Senate reform part of their platform.68 State legislatures, 
too, began pushing for the amendment, with California and Iowa, as early as 1874, pe-
titioning Congress to amend the Constitution to create direct senatorial elections.69 
By 1902, three states had held separate referenda asking voters whether they would 
prefer direct senatorial elections, and in each case the vote was overwhelmingly in fa-
vor the change: 451,319 to 76,975 in Illinois in 1902; 187,958 to 13,342 in California in 
1892; and 6,775 to 866 in Nevada in 1983.70 By 1905, 31 state legislatures had in some 
way communicated to Congress its support for direct senatorial elections.71 Yet, even 
this number, as high as it was, did not reflect the full measure of state support because 
many states had already adopted state laws requiring direct senatorial election.72 
In 1906, 29 delegates from 11 states gathered in Iowa at what was called the 
Inter-State Senatorial Amendment Convention, an effort to accelerate the change that 
most states by then supported.73 The goal of the convention was to coordinate efforts 
to ultimately petition Congress to call a convention to propose an amendment to cre-
ate direct senatorial elections.74 Although Iowans and others had long supported this 
idea for amending the Constitution, their efforts had borne no fruit. Faced with no con-
gressional action on an amendment, the Governor of Iowa convened the event and 
made clear his objectives when he called the convention to order:
Hitherto this sentiment has not been productive or results, and during the last session 
of the General Assembly it seemed to the members who compose that body that there 
was but one effective and practical way in which to take the views of the people of this 
country upon the proposed change in the election of Senators. It was to adopt the other 
alternative provided in the Constitution of the United States, and ask our sister states to 
co-operate with us in presenting a petition to Congress that would require action upon 
the part of that body in the way of convening a constitutional convention.75
The convention had been authorized by a joint resolution of the Iowa Gener-
al Assembly. The Assembly directed the Governor of Iowa to invite other governors 
67  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 103-04.
68  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 105.
69  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 106.
70  HAYNES, George H. Idem. Ibidem.
71  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 110.
72  HAYNES, George H. Idem. p. 111.
73  Report of the Proceedings of the Inter-State Senatorial Amendment Convention, Des Moines, Iowa, Decem-
ber 5-6, 1906, at 23-24.
74  Idem. at 14.
75  Idem. Ibidem
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to send representatives to the Inter-State Convention.76 The joint resolution, passed 
in March 1906, noted that seventeen states were at the time on record as petitioning 
Congress to approve an amendment proposal establishing direct senatorial elections 
and that seven states had by that time petitioned Congress to call a convention for the 
purpose of proposing an amendment to create direct senatorial elections.77
By the time Congress eventually approved the Seventeenth Amendment and 
transmitted it to the states in 1912, over half of the states had already adopted direct 
senatorial elections, or something quite close to it, as a matter of either law or prac-
tice.78 For example, states would hold elections whose results were ‘advisory’ to the 
legislatures; the legislature of course retained the constitutional responsibility to select 
senators themselves, but their members found it difficult to ignore the results of those 
elections since they were essentially ‘referenda instructing state legislators’.79 States 
generally took three paths toward direct senatorial election even before the Seven-
teenth Amendment was proposed and ratified: amending their constitution, passing 
laws, and following political practices that ‘sidestep legislative selection of senators’.80 
These subnational approaches reflected the distinctive strategy of the progressive 
movement: to pursue change at the state level, for instance through uniform state leg-
islation or by piecemeal, to make it close to inevitable at the national level.81 By 1913, 
at least 34 states had effectively evolved by law or practice to elect their senators even 
before it was required by constitutional amendment.82
4.1.  The impetus for the Seventeenth Amendment
There were at least three motivations behind the move to direct senatorial 
elections: curbing corruption in state legislatures; avoiding deadlocks in senatorial 
76  HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators… Op. Cit. p. 106.
77  HAYNES, George H. Idem. at 106-08.
78  STRAUSS, David A. The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments… Op. Cit. p. 1497.
79  BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast: Democracy, Federalism, and the Sirens Song of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. Northwestern Law Review. Chicago, v. 91, n. 2, p. 500-569, sept./dec. 1997. p. 537.
80  CLOPTON, Zachary D.; ART, Steven E. The Meaning of the Seventeenth Amendment and a Century of State 
Defiance. Northwestern Law Review. Chicago, v. 107, n. 3, p. 1181-1242, mar./jun. 2013. p. 1190.
81  GRAEBNER, William. Federalism in the Progressive Era: A Structural Interpretation of Reform. The Journal of 
American History. Oxford, v. 64, n. 2, p. 331-357, sept. 1977. p. 332.
82  WIEGAND, Elva. A History of the Movement for the Direct Election of Senators. Los Angeles, 1934. Thesis 
(Master in History) - Department of History, University of Southern California. f. 49.  One of the leading models 
for direct senatorial election was the Oregon plan that invited candidates for state legislature to sign one of 
two statements, either pledging to vote for the U.S. Senate candidate who received the highest popular vote 
in the state or to see the vote as only advisory. KOBACH, Kris W. Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Sev-
enteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. Yale Law Journal. New Haven,  v. 103, n. 7, p. 1971-2007, may 1994. 
p. 1978. 
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elections; and giving greater voice to the people.83 Under the prevailing method of 
indirect senatorial election—state legislators voting for the state’s United States Sena-
tors—corruption in state legislative elections for senators was pervasive, as observers 
at the time commented that the process ‘was so corrupt that it produced an unrespon-
sive and unrepresentative Senate’.84 State legislative corruption and interest group 
control of senatorial elections were, as Vikram Amar writes, ‘perhaps the greatest evils 
associated with indirect election’.85 The concern was that indirect senatorial elections 
would lead senatorial candidates to promise money, favors or offices to state legislators 
in return for their vote.86 The corruption concern extended to state governments and 
also to influential yet unelected insiders who would pay off state lawmakers to direct 
their vote in senatorial elections.87
As the legislative history of the Seventeenth Amendment suggests,88 political 
actors believed the problem could be fixed by adopting direct senatorial elections that 
would give power directly to the people and would take it away from the corruptible 
state senators.89 A 1911 report from the United States Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary referred to the ‘instances of bribery and corruption which have taken place in 
the legislatures of the different States in the last 25 years, and which could not have 
occurred had popular elections prevailed’.90 There was evidence that state legislators 
had sold their votes to elect senators that would not have otherwise been elected.91
A constitutional amendment was necessary to address the problem on a nation-
al scale.92 It ‘completed the centralizing process that the public canvass began’, after 
states had come onboard with their own reforms and in light of the popular support be-
hind the idea of direct election.93 Despite strong evidence of corruption in seven states 
in the fifteen years preceding the successful proposal of the Seventeenth Amendment 
83  BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast… Op. Cit. p. 538-47.
84  SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Electing the Senate: Indirect Democracy Before the Seven-
teenth Amendment. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. p. 10.
85  AMAR, Vikram David. Indirect Effects of Direct Election: A Structural Examination of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment. Vanderbilt Law Review. v. 49, n. 6, p. 1347-1407, nov. 1996. p. 1353.
86  See TEACHOUT, Zephyr. Corruption in America: From Benjamin Franklin’s Snuff Box to Citizens United. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014. p. 123.
87  AMAR, Akhil Reed. America’s Constitution: A Biography. New York: Random House, 2005. p. 412.
88  See LITTLE, Laura E. An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth Amendment. Temple Law 
Review. Philadelphia, v. 64, n. 3, p. 629-658, sept./dec. 1991. p. 640.
89  CROOK, Sara Brandes; HIBBING, John R. A Not-so-distant Mirror: The 17th Amendment and Congressional 
Change. American Political Science Review. Washington, D.C., v. 91, n. 4, p. 845-853, dec. 1997. p. 845.
90  Report No. 961 to accompany S.J. Res. 134, Committee on the Judiciary, ‘Election of Senators by Popular 
Vote’, January 11, 1911, 61st Cong. 3d Sess., at 14.
91  BYBEE. Jay S. Ulysses at the Mast… Op. Cit. p. 539.
92  HAYNES, George H. The Election of Senators… Op. Cit. p.  53.
93  RIKER, William H. The Senate and American Federalism. American Political Science Review. New York, v. 49, 
n. 2, p. 452-469, july 1955. p. 467.
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in 1912, the United States Senate was not keen to investigate these matters. Indeed, 
the Senate showed ‘extreme reluctance to investigate such charges, and [] bound itself 
by precedents which ma[d]e not only the unseating of a member, but even the pursuit 
of a thoroughgoing investigation, practically impossible, except where the evidence 
of guild [was] overwhelming and notorious’.94 Of the ten senators investigated by the 
Senate before 1900, only two senators ultimately resigned their seat, though in neither 
case had the Senate yet taken a vote on the specific resolution concerning allegations 
of corruption.95 
It is worth recalling one corruption case. On July 13, 1912, two months after the 
Congress had approved the Seventeenth Amendment and transmitted it to the states 
for ratification, the Senate invalidated the election of Illinois Senator William Lorimer.96 
Elected in 1909 under the original process of indirect senatorial election, Lorimer had 
been cleared of the corruption charges in 1911 when the Senate dropped the matter 
after a six-week inquiry.97 But when new public charges came to light a week before 
the Senate voted on the proposed Seventeenth Amendment, the Senate reopened the 
Lorimer case.98 Lorimer, it was proven to the Senate’s satisfaction, had been elected to 
the United States Senate with the help of at least seven state legislators whose votes 
had been bought with $100,000 raised by large Chicago corporations.99 In the end, four 
of the seven gave confessions in open court.100 This extraordinary case of corruption is 
not representative; it appears to have been the most egregious example that came to 
light at the time.
But David Schleicher questions the corruption narrative that is thought to have 
prompted the move from indirect to direct senatorial elections: if the corrupting forces 
‘had the power to sneak through senators over popular worry about corruption, there 
needs to be an additional explanation for why they did not have enough power to stop 
direct elections—and in fact did not want to’.101 This is an important question and per-
haps one that will remain unanswered, at least with any certainty. But Todd Zywicki 
may have an answer. The Seventeenth Amendment, Zywicki writes, made rent-seeking 
94  RIKER, William H. Idem. Ibidem. 
95  RIKER, William H. Idem. p. 53-56.
96  ‘July 13, 1912: Senator Ousted’, Senate History: 1878-1920, United States Senate, at: http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/minute/Senator_Ousted.htm (last accessed September 1, 2015).
97  Idem.
98  Idem.
99  See BUENKER, John D. Illinois and the Four Progressive-Era Amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Illinois Historical Journal. Springfield, v. 80, sept./dec. 1987. p. 215-16.
100  BUENKER, John D. Idem. at 216. The number could be higher than seven. According to another source, 
supporters of Lorimer paid bribes to forty state legislators. See GRADEL, Thomas J.; SIMPSON, Dick. Corrupt 
Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2014. p. 42-43.
101  SCHLEICHER, David. The Seventeenth Amendment and Federalism in an Age of National Political Parties. 
Hastings Law Journal. San Francisco, v. 65, n. 4, p. 1043-1099, may 2014. p. 1060.
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easier, allowing interest groups to go directly to an elected Senator rather than having 
to canvass an entire state legislature to secure a majority for their preferred candidate: 
‘by making it possible for special interests to lobby Senators directly, rather than having 
to proceed through the intermediary of the state legislatures, the Seventeenth Amend-
ment reduced the costs of lobbying for wealth transfers’.102 As the interest groups grew 
more national and as they sought national influence to advance their cause, it proved 
more effective to lobby one relatively small group of national leaders rather than sever-
al groups of state leaders: ‘because these national interest groups (such as labor unions 
and railroads) were dispersed across several states, it was quite cumbersome and ex-
pensive for them to have to lobbing multiple state legislatures in order to get the Sen-
ate consent to a piece of legislation.’103 Schleicher explains Zywicki’s answer succinctly:
[Interest groups] supported the Amendment for several reasons: it would reduce the cost 
of lobbying for favorable legislation by national interest groups because lobbyists would 
only have to engage with one body and not fifty; it would increase the length of senatori-
al tenures, permitting interest groups to form long-term relationships with senators; and 
it would reduce monitoring of senators because state legislatures were better at ensuring 
that senators did the bidding of the voting public rather than special interest groups. Na-
tional interest groups thus had an interest in direct elections because it made the Senate 
easier to lobby.104
The point, then, according to Zywicki, is that there was more to the Seventeenth 
Amendment than an effort to curb corruption. It may be that the move to direct sena-
torial elections concealed a much less-public effort to redirect rent-seeking behavior so 
as to make it more efficient for interest groups to solicit favors from the federal govern-
ment.105 John McGinnis echoes this view, arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment 
facilitated ‘the rise of the special-interest state’.106 McGinnis writes that the Amendment 
‘increased monitoring costs and entrenched senators in office’ and ‘made it easier for 
interest groups to strike long-term deals’ because the general electorate was much 
less competent than state legislators at monitoring senators.107 Today, with the benefit 
of one century of political life under the Seventeenth Amendment, it is worth asking 
102  ZYWICKI, Todd J. Beyond the Shell and Husk of History… Op. Cit. p. 215.
103  ZYWICKI, Todd J. Idem. p. 216.
104  SCHLEICHER, David. The Seventeenth Amendment… Op. Cit. p. 1061.
105  ZYWICKI, Todd J. Senators and Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment. 
Oregon Law Review. Eugene, v. 73, p. 1007-1055, 1994. p. 1054-55..
106  MCGINNIS, John O. The Original Constitution and its Decline: A Public Choice Perspective. Harvard Journal 
of Law & Public Policy. Cambridge, v. 21, n. 1, p. 195-210, sept./dec. 1997. p. 205.
107  MCGINNIS, John O. Idem. at 206.
Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 35-59, set./dez. 2015.
Richard Albert
52 
whether scholars believe that direct senatorial elections has fulfilled the objective that 
first drove its proposal.
4.2.  The Seventeenth Amendment today
On the occasion of the one hundredth anniversary of the Seventeenth Amend-
ment, Wendy Schiller and Charles Stewart published a report inquiring whether the 
Amendment had fulfilled its intended objectives. The concluded that ‘the 17th Amend-
ment has failed to deliver on its promise, and has produced a Senate that is even less 
responsive to voters than it was under the indirect election system’.108 The key finding 
concerned money in senatorial elections. They estimated that prior to the Seventeenth 
Amendment from 1871 to 1913, there was an average of $214.88 million per year spend 
on senatorial elections.109 This is roughly one-fifth of what was spent in the 2012 Senate 
election cycle: $1.168 billion.110 For Schiller and Stewart, this contrast undermines the 
Amendment: ‘Despite the blatant use of money to win indirect Senate elections, 100 
years after the 17th Amendment was enacted, the modern Senate elections process is 
swamped with campaign money in ways that far outpace elections under the indirect 
elections system’.111 A few years prior, another took a similar view of the Amendment 
but stressed more specific failures: 
In retrospect, the amendment failed to accomplish what was expected of it, and in most 
cases failed dismally. Exorbitant expenditures, alliances with well-financed lobby groups, 
and electioneering sleights-of-hand have continued to characterize Senate campaigns 
long after the constitutional nostrum was implemented. In fact, such tendencies have 
grown increasingly problematic. Insofar as the Senate also has participated in lavishing 
vast sums on federal projects of dubious value to the general welfare, and producing 
encyclopedic volumes of legislation that never will be read or understood by the great 
mass of Americans, it can hardly be the case that popular elections have strengthened 
the upper chamber’s resistance to the advances of special interests.112
The rise of money in senatorial elections has not been at the core of the call 
to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment. The repeal effort has instead relied largely on 
federalism, or ‘states’ rights’, as the rallying cry behind the move to return to indirect 
108  SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. The 100th Anniversary of the 17th Amendment: A Promise Unful-
filled. Issues in Governance Studies. Washington, v. 34, n. 59, p. 1-12, may 2013. p. 1.
109  SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. p. 6-7.
110  SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. Ibidem. 
111  SCHILLER, Wendy J.; STEWART III, Charles. Idem. p. 7.
112  HOEBEKE, C.H. Democratizing the Constitution: The Failure of the Seventeenth Amendment. IX Humani-
tas - National Humanities Institute, Center for Constitutional Studies. Available at: http://www.nhinet.org/
hoebeke.htm (last accessed September 1, 2015).
The progressive era of constitutional amendment
53Revista de Investigações Constitucionais, Curitiba, vol. 2, n. 3, p. 35-59, set./dez. 2015.
senatorial elections. According to repeal proponents, doing away with direct senatorial 
elections would restore the federalist balance created by the Constitution: state legisla-
tures would once again have the power to send to Washington only those senators they 
believed would be responsive to the state’s needs.113 Ted Cruz, for example, has argued 
that the Seventeenth Amendment was a ‘major step toward the explosion of federal 
power and the undermining of the authority of the states’.114 A common critique of the 
Amendment is that it disrupted the founding design of the Constitution, and that re-
peal would return the country to where it began and where it should be. One commen-
tator, for instance, argues that a return to indirect senatorial elections ‘would check the 
federal government’s proclivity to pass laws binding the state to unfunded mandates. 
It would increase the sovereignty of the several states and restore true federalism back 
into our system of government’.115
It is worth wondering whether restoring the original method of indirect sena-
torial elections would have the effect that repeal advocates anticipate, that is to say a 
rebalancing of federalism. On one view, returning to indirect senatorial elections would 
align the tenure of senators to how well they defend their state’s interest rather than 
the national interests. It is also likely the case, as one observer acknowledges, that ‘sen-
ators still would be just as likely to be corrupted’ but it also likely that ‘the corruption 
would be dispersed to the 50 separate state legislatures’ and even then, ‘the corruption 
more often would be on behalf of state interests’. This corruption, the same observer 
notes, would be remediable ‘by the vigilance of voters for more responsive state leg-
islative seats (typically, about less than 50,000 residences per state legislator), rather 
than Senate seats (the entire population of the state—usually millions.)’.116 This is an 
honest defense of indirect senatorial elections insofar as it recognizes that corruption 
is inevitable in either case.
But it is not clear that repealing the Seventeenth Amendment would necessarily 
reinstate indirect senatorial elections as a matter of practice, whatever it would mean 
as a matter of formal law. Assume the Seventeenth Amendment were repealed today. 
The Constitution would revert to its original appointment rule, requiring state legisla-
tures to select their senators. But, in my view, that direct election would nonetheless 
113  HOEBEKE, C.H. Idem. One state senator has even called on his state legislature to rescind its ratification 
of the Seventeenth Amendment. See HACKEN, Kelsey. Rescind Seventeenth Amendment, Indiana Lawmaker 
Proposes. Heartlander Magazine. Available at: http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2015/02/19/in-
diana-lawmaker-proposes-rescinding-seventeenth-amendment (last accessed September 1, 2015).
114  GREENBLATT, Alan. Rethinking the 17th Amendment: An Old Idea Gets Fresh Opposition. NPR. Available at: 
http://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2014/02/05/271937304/rethinking-the-17th-amendment-an-old-
idea-gets-fresh-opposition (last accessed September 1, 2015).
115  See KOEHL, Theodore. How to Repeal the 16th and 17th Amendments. American Thinker. Available at: 
http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2013/07/how_to_repeal_the_16th_and_17th_amendments.html 
(last accessed September 1, 2015).
116  Idem. 
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remain a political and legal fact of senatorial selection. The laws mandating direct sen-
atorial elections even before to the Amendment, as discussed above,117 would likely 
be revived. It would be difficult for state legislators to justify denying voters their right, 
acquired by prior law and practice, to choose their own senators.118 What is perhaps 
more problematic for the effort to repeal the amendment while concurrently prohib-
iting voters from choosing their own senators is that the amendment repealing the 
Seventeenth would have to be designed to effectively preclude all the different devices 
state legislatures could use to promote popular election of senators. It would also have 
to be designed to preclude indirect forms of popular election, for instance where the 
state legislature would select the candidate who was ahead in public opinion polls. Not 
only would this design be difficult to perfect but it would be an unreasonable choice 
for designers to make.
5. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that the effort to repeal the Seventeenth Amendment will turn 
grow into a movement like the one that first drove the Amendment’s proposal and 
ratification one hundred years ago. But even if support continues to build to repeal the 
Amendment, the formal amendment rules of Article V will almost certainly lead to its 
defeat. Constitutional amendment in the United States is next to impossible, or at least 
it is today. It could of course in the future become much less daunting, just as it became 
during the Progressive Era, when constitutional amendment seemed for some too easy 
in comparison to what it had been before. Fewer than thirty years before the entrench-
ment of the Seventeenth Amendment, Woodrow Wilson, writing in 1885, highlighted 
the difficulty of constitutional amendment under the United States Constitution, refer-
ring to the ‘cumbrous machinery of formal amendment erected by Article Five’.119
Today, political actors introduce constitutional amendments on all subjects. 
Congresspersons introduce proposals on subjects ranging from campaign finance,120 
to prayer in schools121 and to presidential term limits,122 and state legislatures peti-
tion Congress to propose amendments to repeal federal laws,123 to require a balanced 
117  See supra Section 4.1.
118  See SPIVAK, Joshua. Don’t Repeal the 17th Amendment. Forbes.com. Available at: http://www.forbes.
com/2010/04/02/seventeenth-amendment-repeal-louie-gohmert-opinions-contributors-joshua-spivak.html 
(last accessed September 1, 2015).
119  WILSON, Woodrow. Congressional Government. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1885. 
p. 242.
120  See H.R.J. Res. 31, 113th Cong. (2013).
121  See H.R.J. Res. 42, 113th Cong. (2013).
122  See H.R.J. Res. 19, 113th Cong. (2013).
123  See H.R. Res. 12-1003, 68th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2012).
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budget124 and to prohibit abortion.125 Some of these amendments, and indeed per-
haps most of them, are introduced for narrow parochial purposes that David Mayhew 
categorizes as position taking, credit claiming, or advertising.126 
Perhaps the history and methods of the Progressive movement can offer mod-
ern American constitutional reformers a roadmap for achieving formal constitution-
al change. For those amendments whose proposers believe could have a legitimate 
chance at eventual proposal and ratification, the Progressive movement is a good mod-
el for how to create and ultimately entrench social change. Of course, it would be diffi-
cult if not impossible to replicate the success of the Progressive Era. Four amendments 
in the span of a decade is unprecedented in American history since the Bill of Rights, 
and it would be surprising if such a feat were ever to be repeated.
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